Tracing the Legitimacy of Artificial Intelligence – A Media Analysis, 1980-2020 by Korneeva, Ekaterina & Salge, Torsten Oliver
Tracing the Legitimacy of Artificial Intelligence –  




RWTH Aachen University 
korneeva@time.rwth-aachen.de 
Torsten Oliver Salge 





Artificial Intelligence (AI) has received 
ambivalent evaluations, ranging from AI as a great 
opportunity and solution to crucial problems of our 
time to AI as a threat to humanity. For AI technologies 
to diffuse, they need to gain legitimacy. We trace the 
legitimacy of AI in society from 1980 to 2020. For our 
analysis, we rely on 2,543 newspaper articles from 
The New York Times as a reflection of societal 
discourse over the legitimacy of AI. Using computer-
assisted content analysis, we find a sharp increase in 
media coverage around the mid-2010s. We find the 
language used in the articles to be predominantly 
positive and to show little changes over time. Our 
analysis also uncovers six highly discussed industries 
in the context of AI.  
1. Introduction  
During the last decade, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), defined as intelligence performed by machines 
[1], has received scientific and commercial attention. 
The number of scientific publications, patent files, and 
investment has been sharply increasing since 2012 [2]. 
The number of patents grew by 28% annually between 
2012 and 2017, with 53% of all patents on AI being 
published during that period [2]. Investments in AI 
start-ups rose from US$ 1,7 billion in 2013 to over 
US$ 15 billion in 2017, with a sharp increase around 
2015 [3]. The developments can be traced back to an 
increase in computing power, a decrease in the price 
of computing, and the emergence of ubiquitous 
computing, resulting in huge amounts of stored data 
(big data) [3]. AI has found application in various 
fields. From credit scoring [4] and job applicant 
selection [5] automated driving [6].  
Despite the achievements in this field, the 
development of AI and its impact on society is seen as 
ambivalent by scholars. Some view the immediate 
impacts of AI as a great opportunity for economic 
growth and innovation [7], while others see it as a 
threat. The raised concerns refer to the elimination of 
jobs (e.g., replacement of humans through AI-based 
automation) [8], the loss of privacy and self-efficacy 
(e.g., ubiquitous AI-technologies that trace every 
aspect of individuals’ lives) [9], the loss of 
transparency of decisions [10], and possible bias and 
discrimination against (e.g., credit scoring and job 
applicant selection) [11].  In the long run, some 
researchers view AI as the only solution for the 
survival of humanity (i.e., we need AI to solve the big 
issues of our time) [12], while others view it as the 
inevitable end of humanity [e.g., as discussed by 13]. 
AI researchers have a very distinct and grounded 
opinion on AI, which they publish in research papers, 
conference talks, and interviews.  
Likewise, users and the general public struggle 
with assessing the legitimacy of AI and its manifold 
applications. Legitimacy refers to the congruence of 
organizational activities and their cultural 
environment [14, 15]. Legitimacy is indispensable for 
the diffusion of novel technologies as it lays the 
ground for acceptance [16].  
The ambivalent evaluation of AI raises questions 
on the legitimacy of AI in society. The developments 
during the last decade stress the urgency to investigate 
the legitimacy of AI in society. It is against this 
backdrop that we trace the legitimacy of AI in society 
from 1980 to 2020. For our analysis, we rely on mass 
media in reflecting public attention and evaluation of 
AI. We analyzed 2,543 newspaper articles from The 
New York Times discussing AI. We argue that public 
discourse reflected in media is ideally suited to shed 
light on the legitimacy evaluation of new, ambivalent 
technologies [e.g., 17].  
The systematic analysis of media coverage using 
computer-assisted content analysis of AI allows us to 
understand (a) whether a public discourse is taking 
place, (b) in which domains (e.g., industries) it takes 
place, and (c) whether the discourse is rather 
legitimizing or de-legitimizing media framing is used. 
Following a qualitative approach allows us to better 
understand why certain developments can be observed 
using quantitative methods.  





Our analysis provides evidence that societal 
discourse follows scientific and technological 
developments. We observe a sharp increase in media 
coverage in the mid-2010s. More importantly, the 
language used in the articles is rather positive, 
indicating a legitimizing media framing, instead of a 
de-legitimizing media framing, dominates the media 
coverage. Additionally, we identified six industries 
that are highly discussed in the context of AI: Art and 
Entertainment, Automotive, Finance, Health Care, 
Manufacturing, and Online Services. The picture of 
the legitimizing media framing remained similar in the 
industries as in the total sample: rather positive.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Legitimacy 
As a central concept in institutional theory, 
legitimacy refers to the congruence between 
organizational activities and their cultural 
environment [14, 15]. Legitimacy has been defined as 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”  (Suchman 
1995, p. 574). Thereby, entities can refer to 
organizations, individuals, business models, 
industries, technologies, etc. [19].  
The literature distinguishes between three kinds 
of legitimacy: pragmatic, cognitive, and normative 
[18, 19]. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on self-
interested utility calculation of the organizations’ 
immediate audience [18]. Normative legitimacy is 
gained by conforming to societal norms, values, and 
shared beliefs. Cognitive legitimacy refers to entities’ 
comprehensiveness and take-for-grandness. While 
pragmatic and normative legitimacy evaluations rest 
on discursive evaluations, cognitive legitimacy does 
not [18]. The public can arrive at utility and ethical 
judgments through explicit public discussion. While 
cognitive legitimacy can be given to entities regardless 
of whether they have received positive, negative, or no 
evaluation [19]. Normative and cognitive legitimacy 
both refer to the wider society [16] and not only to the 
immediate audience, as is the case for pragmatic 
legitimacy [18].  
Entities need to gain and maintain legitimacy to 
emerge, expand and survive [15]. Legitimacy has been 
shown to play a crucial role during the formation of 
new organizations [20] and new industries [19]. 
Emerging entities need to secure critical resources, 
attract investors, form demand, and convince 
policymakers [16, 19, 20]. Gaining legitimacy over 
new technologies, which are not embedded into the 
social order, organizations face the “liability of 
newness” [21, 22], which comes with two challenges. 
Entities introducing a new technology face the 
challenge of creating new constituencies and receiving 
support from existing legitimate entities [18]. Ashforth 
and Gibbs [23] find the challenges to be especially 
profound for risky or uncertain technologies and the 
organizations’ objectives are controversial.  
Legitimacy has been shown to positively affect the 
development and societal embedding of new 
technologies as it attracts resources from investors and 
support from policymakers [24]. Hence, legitimacy is 
especially crucial when introducing new technologies.  
New technologies can gain normative legitimacy, 
through a public discursive evaluation [21, 22]. For 
societal discourse to result in legitimacy, rather than 
the loss of legitimacy, new technologies need to align 
with their environment and social rules. Only then can 
they pass cultural filters. Hence, collective legitimacy 
judgments function as a form of social control. 
Legitimacy is the result of a continuous societal 
discourse [25], which is reflected in media [26-30]. 
2.2. Media Coverage and Legitimacy 
Media reflects and shapes public opinion and 
evaluation [26]. As socially embedded individuals 
[31], journalists integrate cultural norms and values 
into their work through their selection and framing of 
issues they report. Media coverage reflects cultural 
interpretation [29] and acceptability [32] of events. 
Hence, media reflects public approval [33]. This 
allows assessing collective legitimacy judgments by 
examining media framings.  
Entman [34] states that “to frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation” (p. 52). Framings in media interpret 
certain societal developments by selectively 
punctuating and encoding events [35]. Media framings 
can approve developments while neglecting others 
[28]. Media framings are held together by 
vocabularies [17].  
Relying on media coverage as a form of public 
discourse and legitimacy evaluation, researchers 
investigated the framing of different developments 
and events. Geels and Verhees [16] investigated the 
legitimacy of nuclear power from 1945 to 1986 by 
relying on daily newspapers. The scholars showed 
how the legitimacy changed over time: from initially a 
rather legitimizing media framing in the 1950s and 
1960s to a rather de-legitimizing framing in the 1970s 
by referring to the anti-nuclear movement. Markard, 
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Wirth and Truffer [36] analyzed media framings to 
examine the introduction of novel technology: biogas 
technology. The results show how the framing of a 
promising technology changed from a legitimizing 
framing in the beginning to a de-legitimizing framing 
over thirteen years. Similarly, other studies relied on 
media coverage to study legitimacy judgments of 
industrial restructuring [30] and casino gambling [37]. 
The studies translate theoretical questions on 
legitimacy into empirical questions about media 
framings. We follow this approach and draw on media 
coverage studying the legitimacy of AI. 
3. Research Context 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is intelligence 
demonstrated by machines mimicking human 
intelligence (Revell 2019). Intelligence is difficult to 
define, or as Max Tegmark puts it: “There’s no 
agreement on what intelligence is even among 
intelligent intelligence researchers!” [13]. In the case 
of artificial intelligence, machines are considered to 
act intelligently when they can make the right decision 
under uncertainty (New Scientist 2017).  
AI can manifest in computer vision, which among 
others, find application in autonomous vehicles, 
medical diagnostics, and surveillance and security. 
Language processing AI finds application in 
translation software, speech recognition, and is often 
used in entertainment and personal speech assistants 
(e.g., Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa). Besides the 
upsides, opportunities, and promises, the development 
of AI is also bearing some risks. The loss of jobs [e.g., 
38], a threat to privacy  [e.g., 39], replacing humans in 
general, or “breaking out” (i.e., not being in control of 
humans [e.g., 13], are often discussed issues in the 
context of AI. It is, hence, worth investigating the 
media framing of AI to get an understanding of public 
opinion on the legitimacy of this rising technology. 
 
4. Research Method and Data 
To examine the legitimacy of AI applications, we 
follow an established approach in communication 
research by drawing on newspaper articles as a 
reflection of public opinion [26]. In contrast to 
specialized magazines and niche communications 
(e.g., weblogs, Internet platforms), newspapers target 
and represent a broad audience [40]. Furthermore, 
renowned newspapers use objective, distancing 
language in their articles while abstaining from strong 
opinions. Unlike online sources, newspapers form a 
metric for established cultural associations that is 
comparable over time [37]. Therefore, newspapers 
serve as a reliable and robust indicator of public 
opinion [17, 32].  
4.1. Sample  
For our study, we relied on newspaper articles 
from The New York Times (NYT). The NYT is a 
nationally and internationally influential daily 
newspaper with a high reputation and circulation [41]. 
The newspaper is widely perceived as an opinion 
leader in various fields and topics [42], including 
practices and implications of emerging technologies 
[43]. The NYT is the most cited newspaper in 
scientific publications, often demonstrating public 
discourse and interest in certain topics [44].  
We retrieved NYT newspaper articles on the topic 
AI from 1980 to 2020 via LexisNexis. To select the 
relevant articles for our study from all available 
articles in the NYT archive, we searched for keywords 
in the article title and the full text. Besides “Artificial 
Intelligence,” we also searched for closely related 
terms. Thereby, we relied on the systematic approach 
proposed by Wagener [45]. This includes a total of 
distinct keywords: “Artificial Intelligence,” “Machine 
Learning,” “Deep Learning,” “Reinforcement 
Learning,” “Supervised Learning,” “Unsupervised 
Learning,” and “Neural Network”.  If the article title 
or the full text entailed one of the keywords, we 
included it in our sample. Our search resulted in 6,811 
articles.  
In a second step, we inspected the frequency of 
keywords per article. We counted how often our 
keywords occurred in our selected articles. We found 
4,185 articles with less than two matches with our 
keywords. Of those articles, we manually inspected a 
random sample of 100 articles. It proved that AI has 
not been the focus of those articles, although it was 
mentioned (e.g., the article was about a person 
winning a lottery who is also interested in AI). Hence, 
we dropped articles with less than two matches of our 
keywords. Furthermore, for the industry analysis, we 
relied on the indexing terms provided by LexisNexis. 
We dropped 83 articles due to missing indexing terms 
for the industry. This resulted in a sample of 2,543 
NYT articles on AI with an average text length of 791 
words (sd = 708, min = 24, max = 10,018).  
4.2. Procedure 
Our study aims to analyze the legitimacy of AI 
applications. For our analysis, we followed a 
qualitative and quantitative approach. In the first step, 
we employed a narrative content analysis [46]. In a 
second step, we relied on automated content analysis 
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techniques [47]. Combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods provides a holistic understanding 
of the legitimacy of AI [48]. In our qualitative 
analysis, we reconstructed inductively what and why 
particular developments of AI triggered public 
attention (e.g., AI beating humans in certain games). 
The results are presented as narratives, as descriptions 
of particularly distinctive events, and as an overview 
of fundamental developments and milestones of AI. 
For the quantitative analysis of public legitimacy 
judgment, we performed an automated content 
analysis of newspaper articles. To prepare our sample 
for the content analysis, we cleaned the newspaper 
articles. The cleaning process included word 
stemming, lemmatizing, setting to lower case, 
removing numbers, removing common English words 
(e.g., “and,” “the,” “or,” etc.) and removing common 
words of our sample (e.g., “new,” “york,” “times”).  
Our aim was not only to investigate the legitimacy 
of AI in general but also to uncover critical industries. 
In the first step, we assigned industries to each article. 
Thereby, we relied on the industry indexing terms 
provided by LexisNexis for each article. The articles 
in our sample were assigned between 1 and 79 industry 
indexing terms. In total, our sample was assigned 
32,626 industry indexing terms, using 500 distinct 
industry indexing terms. We used the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) to classify 
the industry indexing terms assigned by LexisNexis. 
Two independent coders assigned each of the industry 
indexing terms to the NAICS industries. In cases 
where the coders assigned the indexing terms to 
different NAICS industries, we asked them to review 
the assigned indexing terms of the other coder and 
state whether they agree. Only if both coders agreed to 
assign the indexing term to a NAICS industry, we 
included it in our analysis. We took a threshold of a 
minimum of 300 articles per industry (>10% of the 
sample) to include the industry into our analysis. 
Furthermore, both coders suggested adding “Online 
Services” to the NAICS industries, as this was a 
prominent theme among the industry indexing terms 
assigned by LexisNexis. In total, we identified six 
industries that are highly discussed in the context of 
AI: “Arts and Entertainment,” “Automotive,” 
“Finance,” “Health Care,” “Manufacturing,” and 
“Online Services”.  
We performed an automated sentiment analysis to 
systematically identify legitimizing and de-
legitimizing media framings in our sample. Although 
unable to fully capture contextual meaning, text 
mining methods allow for transparency and 
replicability of findings. Additionally, these methods 
provide complete consistency in coding over the entire 
data set. These advantages over human assessment 
make a computer-assisted content analysis of 
qualitative text data (i.e., media coverage) a popular 
approach to analyzing legitimacy judgments [49]. 
We relied on the established LIWC dictionaries 
“posemo” and “negemo” measuring positive and 
negative connotations for our sentiment analysis. 
LIWC is well-established and has been validated by 
psychologists, sociologists, and linguists in over a 
decade of work [50]. LIWC is a reliable dictionary to 
extract sentiment polarity from media text. 
Legitimizing media framings are usually associated 
with positively connoted language, while negatively 
connoted language is associated with delegitimizing 
media framings [36, 37, 51]. Table 1 shows an extract 
from the dictionary used.  
 
Table 1: LIWC dictionary. 







accepta* abuse*  
brillian* disappoint*  
improve* negclect*  
opportun* suspicio*  
 
The sentiment of each article was determined by 
counting the number of positive and negative words as 
defined by the LIWC dictionary. This measure gives 
us the absolute term frequency. The absolute term 
frequency depends on the length of an article, which 
results in a bias: longer articles have a higher term 
frequency. To account for this, we calculated the 
relative term frequency. Therefore, we divided the 
term frequency by the total number of words of each 
article. In the next step, we calculated the mean 
relative term frequency per year to illustrate how 
media framing shave changed over time. Finally, we 
performed sentiment analyses for each industry. 
5. Results 
5.1. Qualitative Results 
We subdivided the reconstruction of 
developments of AI reflected in the NYT into four 
phases: 1980-1989; 1990-1999, 2000-2009; 2010-
2020. In this section, we provide an overview of public 
discourse on AI in the form of descriptive narratives 
[46] and draw on examples from the public discourse 
[52]. The findings emerge from in-depth and inductive 
qualitative analysis of our sample. We iterated 
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between data and the generated concepts until stability 
in interpretation was reached [53]. 
 
5.1.1. 1980-1989: Rise and Fall of AI (162 
observations). In 1980 the first National Conference 
of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence 
was held at Stanford [54]. The early 1980s also marked 
the starting point of commercial applications based on 
AI research, which resulted in increased funding for 
academic research. However, with the collapse of the 
Lisp Machine market (computers optimized to process 
the preferred programming language for AI) by the 
end of the 1980s, AI lost its reputation, and a period of 
reduced funding and interest in AI began. This period 
is referred to as the second AI winter, after the first 
winter in the 1970s [55, 56]. Our sample provides an 
article from 1986 that shows high hope in computer 
vision for automobile manufacturing.  
 
“After decades of research and development, a 
key element in the automation of American factories – 
devices that allow machines to ‘see’ – is falling into 
place. […] These vision systems rely on cameras that 
create images, as the eye does, and on computers that 
interpret them, as the brain does. Proponents say 
manufacturers are just beginning to comprehend their 
vast potential.” [54] 
 
Two years later, an article titled “Setbacks for 
Artificial Intelligence” shows that AI’s failure to fulfill 
the corporations’ expectations of human-level 
intelligence and discusses the issues with Lisp.  
 
“A major retrenchment is occurring in the 
artificial intelligence industry, dashing the hopes of 
many companies that thought they would prosper by 
providing the technology to make computers ''think.'' 
Some of the setback stems from the failure of artificial 
intelligence to quickly live up to its promise […].”[57] 
 
“The academic researchers believed in the 
special programming language for artificial 
intelligence called Lisp, and they used computers 
tailored to run it. At first, sales were strong […]. But 
soon that market became saturated, and artificial 
intelligence had trouble migrating to the mainstream 
of corporate America. Corporate […] wanted to 
develop artificial intelligence programs without 
requiring their own programmers to learn Lisp.” [57] 
 
5.1.2. 1990-1999: AI can’t hold up its promises (106 
observations). After the second AI winter, only in the 
late 1990s, AI began to flourish again. An increase in 
computational power and the focus on specific isolated 
problems were named as aspects for the successful 
development of AI in the 90s. In 1997 the IBM chess-
playing machine “Deep Blue” defeated the reigning 
world chess champion, Garry Kasparov [58]. 
However, critical voices are raised against this 
milestone as those claim that winning chess is not 
sufficient to demonstrate intelligence. In this context, 
the strategy game “Go” was set as the new standard to 
be won to demonstrate AI, while chess was put apart 
as primitive instead.  
A repeating theme found in the 1990s is whether 
computers are or will be smarter than us humans. The 
myth that AI could mimic human intelligence led to a 
“crashing disappointment” in research on AI [59]. In 
this context, we find titles like “Smarter Than Us? 
Who's Us,?” “No HAL Yet: Artificial Intelligence 
Visions Underestimated the Mind,” and “Japan Plans 
Computer to Mimic Human Brain”. 
 
“Deep Blue’s recent trouncing of Garry 
Kasparov sent shock waves through the Western 
world. […] Go fans proudly note, a computer has not 
come close to mastering what remains a uniquely 
human game. […] To play a decent game of Go, a 
computer must be endowed with the ability to 
recognize subtle, complex patterns and to draw on the 
kind of intuitive knowledge that is the hallmark of 
human intelligence. ‘It may be a hundred years before 
a computer beats humans at Go – maybe even longer,’ 
said Dr. Piet Hut […]. When or if a computer defeats 
a human Go champion, it will be a sign that artificial 
intelligence is truly beginning to become as good as 
the real thing. [58] 
 
5.1.3. 2000-2009: The beginning of the AI spring 
(144 observations). The failed promises which caused 
the AI winter continued into the 2000s. AI had by then 
become a term avoided by computer scientists and 
software engineers “for fear of being viewed as wild-
eyed dreamers” [55]. However, around the mid 2000s, 
there was “talk about an AI spring among researchers 
like Sebastian Thrun, the director of the Stanford lab” 
[55]. It was about the same time when DARPA 
introduces its Grand Challenge for autonomous 
vehicles and fosters research in autonomous vehicles.  
 
“The five robots […] demonstrated the re-
emergence of artificial intelligence, a technology field 
that for decades has overpromised and 
underdelivered. […] But the work of a small team of 
researchers at the Stanford Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory is helping to restore credibility to the field. 
[…] The ability of the vehicles to complete a complex 
everyday task – driving – underscores how artificial 




Two years after a vehicle was autonomously 
navigated through the desert, DARPA launched the 
Urban Challenge for autonomous cars to obey traffic 
rules and drive safely in urban settings [60]. Another 
two years later (2009), Google, a software company – 
not a car manufacturer – started to build its own 
autonomous car [61]. 
 
5.1.4. 2010-2020: AI about to reach its potential 
(2131 observations). The beginning of the decade was 
accompanied by access to large amounts of data (i.e., 
big data), increasing computer power coupled with 
decreasing prices, and advances in machine learning 
technologies [62, 63]. Several events reached public’s 
attention. In 2011, IBM’s computer system, Watson, 
defeated the two greatest Jeopardy! champions [64]. 
The winning of AlphaGo against world’s best Go 
players in 2016 and 2017 marked a milestone in the 
development of AI as Go was considered a complex 
game (e.g., compared to chess).  
The year 2015 is considered a landmark for AI 
[65]. The use of AI at Google increased from a 
sporadic use in 2012 to over 2,700 projects by 2015 
[65]. Not only the quantity of AI applications 
increased but also their performance (e.g., lower error 
rates in image processing) [65]. By 2016, the market 
for AI-related services, hardware, and software 
reached over 8 billion dollars [66]. Advances in big 
data and deep learning drove progress in video 
processing, text analysis, and speech recognition [67]. 
In 2017, 20% of companies stated to integrate “AI in 
some offerings or processes” [68]. In 2020, the AI lab 
in San Francisco “OpenAI” unveiled their new system 
GPT-3, a language processing system that matches 
human performance [69]. This achievement is seen as 
a breakthrough, as it comes close to human 
intelligence.  
 
“For many artificial intelligence researchers, it is 
an unexpected step toward machines that can 
understand the vagaries of human language – and 
perhaps even tackle other human skills.”[69] 
5.2. Quantitative Results  
To uncover the development of the public 
discourse of AI, we analyzed the frequency of AI-
related articles in the NYT over time. An increase in 
the number of articles indicates an increase in public 
discourse. Figure 1 shows the number of articles per 
year. The figure shows a sharp increase in media 
coverage around 2015, where the number of articles 
triples compared to the previous year (33 articles in 
2014 vs. 95 articles in 2015). In 2018 the number of 
articles peaks at 552 articles. To put this into 
perspective, the number of articles during the first 35 
years of our analysis (1980-2014) amounts to almost 
the same number: 553 articles. Overall, about 80% of 
all NYT articles published since 1980 were published 
from 2015-2020 (1990 articles), while only about 20% 
were published from 1980-2014 (553 articles). 
 
Figure 1: Number of articles per year. 
To understand how the media framing has 
changed over time, we calculated the mean relative 
term frequency for positive and negative sentiment per 
year. Figure 2 shows a mean relative term frequency 
for de-legitimizing media framing (red) in 1980 of 
0.032. This means that on average, 3.2% of all words 
used in AI-related NYT articles in 1980 were 
negatively connotated. While on average, around 4.5% 
were positively connotated (green). Overall, the 
relative frequency for legitimizing media framing is 
higher than for de-legitimizing media framing. The 
lines in the figure show the trends of media framing. 
While the red line is relatively constant, we observe a 
peak of the green line (legitimizing media framing) 
around the year 2000.  
 
Figure 2: Relative term frequency for 
legitimizing (green) and de-legitimizing 
media framing (red). 
We analyzed the industries in analogy to the 
analysis above. First, we counted the articles per 
industry per year. In a second step, we calculated the 
mean relative term frequency per industry per year. 





























The industry analysis provides a similar picture as 
the overall analysis. We observe a sharp increase 
around the mid-2010s. A peak in 2018 can be observed 
for all but the automotive industry, which peaks a year 
earlier. Media coverage on online services begins in 
1994, with one article and the next one being published 
in 1998. Although public discussion on online services 
starts late and slowly, online services receive the most 
attention according to the total number of articles (852 
articles, ~1/3 of all articles). Media coverage on 
manufacturing and AI is considerably higher than for 
the other industries until 2010. For manufacturing, we 
can observe an increase in media coverage around 
1985 and around the 2000s. Besides the number of 
articles, we also measured the sentiment to investigate 
the media framing for each industry. Figure 4 
summarizes the results.  
The sentiment analysis per industry pictures 
similar to the overall sentiment analysis. On average, 
the relative share of positively connotated words 
(mean relative term frequency) is higher than that of 
negatively connotated words.  
 
Figure 3: Number of articles per year and 
industry. 
6. Discussion  
Our results provide valuable insights into the 
legitimacy of AI. We observe that societal discourse, 
as reflected in media, follows the technological 
development of AI. During the AI winter, starting in 
the late 80s, we observe only a few articles in our 
sample. With technological progress, the attention 
increases. As AI becomes more visible, leaves the 
laboratory, and finds commercial applications, media 
attention increases. AI has received strong attention 
since the mid-2010s, with 80% of all articles analyzed 
being published since 2015. The increased media 
attention indicates that the legitimation process on AI 
is taking place [44]. 
Our sentiment analysis shows a higher relative 
term frequency for legitimizing media framing (on 
average, 5,2% of the words per article are positively 
connotated) than for de-legitimizing media framing 
(on average, 2,3% of the words per article are 
negatively connotated). Hence, AI is discussed more 
often positively than negatively. This indicates that AI 
is perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat [70]. 
Looking at the sentiment over time, we observe a 
steady relative term frequency for positively and 
negatively connoted words in the articles. Especially 
the relative term frequency of legitimizing media 
framing shows little changes over time. The positive 
relative term frequency shows a slight increase around 
the year 2000. However, we do not observe overall 
trends (e.g., increasing or decreasing of relative term 
frequency) in legitimizing or de-legitimizing media 
framings. This finding is somehow surprising, given 
the increasing number of articles discussing issues on 
AI. We would have expected that an increase in public 
discourse might, over time, result in legitimizing or 
de-legitimizing media framing. A resulting 
legitimizing media framing would be visible in 
increasing positive relative term frequency over time 
or decreasing negative relative term frequency [51]. 
Our qualitative results provide a possible 
explanation for this observation. AI has repeatedly 
overpromised and underdelivered. Due to this history, 
the public might be careful putting high hopes into AI. 
Society might expect applications that find their way 
into everyday life with a visible, reliable performance 
by AI. Many people in the Western world have made 
their experiences with AI (e.g., with natural language 
processing in call centers or interactions with voice 
assistants like Alexa). Some of those experiences 
might have given reasons to question how intelligent 
AI is [71]. At the same time, society does not de-
legitimize AI completely, as the potential for AI is not 
negatable. Our results provide evidence that we are in 
the middle of the legitimization process and an 
evaluation of legitimization has not yet taken a 
direction towards legitimization or de-legitimization.  
Online services, as web search and social media, 
dominate the discussions on AI since 2015. About 
one-third of all articles entail online services as a 
theme. Our analysis identified five other highly 
discussed industries in the context of AI: Arts and 
Entertainment, Automotive, Finance, Health Care, and 
Manufacturing. The identification of these industries 
indicates that AI finds application in these, which 
capture society’s attention. All industries follow a 
similar pattern: a high increase in 2015, with a peak in 
2018, and a slight decrease in the last two years of our 
analysis. Hence, we did not find substantial 
differences among the industries in the media framings 

















Figure 4: Relative term frequency for 
legitimizing (green) and de-legitimizing 
media framing (red) per industry. 
The findings of our study provide implications for 
organizations and research. According to institutional 
theory, organizations rely on legitimacy to emerge, 
expand, and survive [15]. Our results indicate that 
there is further societal discourse needed to result in 
the legitimacy of AI. Previous research has 
investigated how organizations can foster societal 
discourse aiming to achieve legitimacy. Castelló, Etter 
and Årup Nielsen [72] have found participation in 
non-hierarchical open platforms and co-construction 
of agendas as feasible means to achieve legitimacy for 
sustainable development. Following a similar 
approach, Tegmark (2017) invites everyone to 
participate in the discussion on how AI will develop 
and how we want it to develop on the website 
futureoflife.org. Organizations can actively foster 
societal discourse for the public to evaluate the 
legitimacy of AI.  
Our findings can be used to support empirical 
studies on AI acceptance and adaptation. Such studies 
usually draw on the technology acceptance model 
(TAM), measuring perceived ease of use and 
perceived usefulness on the individual level [71]. Our 
findings provide insights on the societal level and 
complement those findings.  
7. Limitations and Future Research  
Our findings are not without limitations, which 
provide opportunities for future research. Our analysis 
is based on NYT articles as a single source. This bears 
the risk of capturing the opinion of the readers of the 
media source instead of the general public. There is 
concern that the NYT would represent the opinion of 
white, educated U.S. Americans [73]. This 
shortcoming implicates that more media sources are 
needed for the robustness of our findings. 
Communications researchers suggest a media mix to 
capture public opinion (e.g., TV, social media [27]. 
Exploring the legitimacy of AI in other cultural 
regions beyond the U.S. would present another 
interesting extension for future research. From 2013 
till 2017, 93% of all AI start-up investments went to 
the U.S., China, and the EU [3]. Investigating 
differences among these cultural regions could give 
insights into how factors aside from heavy investment 
influence the legitimacy of AI. Comparing heavily 
funded regions to regions with low investment in AI 
start-ups could give insights into the interplay of 
investment and legitimacy.  
To develop AI applications, huge amounts of data 
are needed for training and later to provide services 
[74]. Since privacy perceptions are known to differ 




















































































































the legitimacy of AI applications in regions that are 
known to differ in their privacy perceptions. 
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